In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTRK), ClickWorker (CLKWRKR), CrowdFlower (CRDFLWR). In these markets, there is a requester who wants to hire workers to accomplish some tasks. Each worker is assumed to give some utility to the requester on getting hired. Moreover each worker has a minimum cost that he wants to get paid for getting hired. This minimum cost is assumed to be private information of the workers. The question then is -if the requester has a limited budget, how to design a direct revelation mechanism that picks the right set of workers to hire in order to maximize the requester's utility?
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is a recent phenomenon that is used to describe the procurement of a large number of workers to do certain tasks. These tasks can be of a variety of natures, and -to give a few examples -include image annotation, data labeling for machine learning systems, consumer surveys, rating search engine results, spam detection, product reviews, etc. There are several platforms (such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTRK)) that facilitate and automate various steps involved in setting up and executing crowdsourcing tasks.
A key challenge in these online labor markets is to be able to properly price the tasks. Since the requester (the one who wants to procure workers) is usually budget constrained, pricing the tasks too high can result in lower output for the requester. On the other hand, pricing the tasks too low can disincentivize workers to work on the tasks. This makes pricing a non-trivial step for the requester when setting up a crowdsourcing task. One idea -to make pricing more automated and to prevent economic loss from poor pricing -is to design a direct revelation mechanism that solicits bids from workers to report their cost of participation, and based on this decide which workers to hire and how much to pay them.
A simple model that captures the above problem is as follows: There is a set S of workers. Worker i has a private cost c i and provides utility u i to the requester on getting hired. We want to design a truthful mechanism that decides which workers to recruit and how much to pay them. The goal is to maximize the requester's utility without violating her budget constraint.
For the above model, Singer (2010) gave an incentive-compatible mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio 1 of 1/6 compared to the offline optimum that knows the costs of the workers. Later on Chen et al. (2011) improved the approximation ratio to 1 2+ √ (2) 0.292 (and to 1/3 for randomized mechanisms). Chen et. al. also showed that no deterministic mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 1 1+ √ (2) 0.414; Singer (2010) showed that no randomized mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 0.5.
Our work is motivated by the following observation: 1 we use the terms approximation factor and competitive ratio interchangeably Most of the crowdsourcing tasks are large-scale in nature in terms of the number of workers involved. On the other hand if one looks at the impossibility result of Chen et al. (2011) , they involve only a small number of workers (specifically, only 3 workers). Thus, this leads to a natural open question -Do these lower bounds extend to the case of large markets? or can one design better mechanisms for this important case of large markets?
In this paper, we seek to understand the above question. We show that one can significantly improve the approximation ratio for the case of large markets. We give a mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of 1 − 1/e 0.63 for large markets. In addition, we show that our mechanism is the best possible mechanism by showing that no truthful budget-feasible mechanism can achieve a factor better than 1 − 1/e. Finally, we look at the more general case of submodular utility functions.
A. The Model
We define the model abstractly: Consider a reverse auction scenario with one buyer and n sellers, where the set of sellers is denoted by S. Each seller i ∈ S owns a single item (denoted by item i) and has a private cost c i for it. The buyer derives a utility of u i from item i. The buyer has a limited budget B, and its goal is to buy a subset of items that maximizes her utility without exceeding her budget.
Note that if the sellers are not strategic and the costs are known to the buyer, then this is the well-known knapsack optimization problem. However, the cost c i is assumed to be a private information of seller i. Thus we are interested in designing direct-revelation mechanisms where the buyer solicits bids from the sellers, and then computes which sellers to buy from and how much to pay them. More formally, a mechanism M consists of two functions A : (R + ) n → {0, 1} n and P : (R + ) n → (R + ) n . The allocation function A(·) takes as input the costs of n sellers and reports the set of winners. The payment function P (·) takes as input the costs of n sellers and reports how much is paid to each seller. We will use functions A i : (R + ) n → {0, 1} and P i : (R + ) n → R + , for each i ∈ S, to refer to the restriction of functions A(·) and P (·) to seller i. In other words, A i , P i represent the ith element of the output of functions A, P , respectively.
The mechanism M = (A, P ) should satisfy the following properties:
1) Budget Feasibility: The sum of the payments made to the sellers should not exceed B, i.e., i P i (c) ≤ B for all c.
2) Individual rationality: A winner i ∈ S is paid at least c i . 3) Truthfulness/Incentive-Compatibility: Reporting the true cost should be a dominant strategy of the sellers, i.e. for all non-truthful reports c i from seller i, it holds that
Among all mechanisms that satisfy the above properties, we are interested in the ones that give high utility to the buyer. Note that no mechanism can achieve utility larger than U * (c, u), where U * (c, u) is the utility of the knapsack optimization problem assuming costs of the sellers are known to the buyer. When there is no risk of confusion, we also denote U * (c, u) by U * for brevity.
We say a mechanism M is an α-approximation (for α ≤ 1) if it gives utility at least α · U * (c, u) for any c and u.
Indivisible vs Divisible Items. Note that the above description is given for indivisible items, however, we can define the above problem for divisible items as well. For instance, if the item being sold by a seller is his own time, then it can be modeled as a divisible item. For fraction x ≤ 1 of a divisible item, the cost of seller i is x.c i and the utility obtained by the buyer is x · u i . The allocation function for divisible items is defined as
More general utility functions. An interesting generalization of the above model is when the utility function over the set of items is a submodular function rather than an additive function. We denote this function by U : 2 S → R + (for additive functions, U (T ) = i∈T u i , for ∀T ⊆ S). We assume that the utility function is known to the buyer.
1) The Large Market Assumption: Crowd-sourcing systems are excellent examples of large markets. Informally speaking, a market is said to be large if the number of participants are large enough that no single person can affect the market outcome significantly. Our results take advantage of this nature of crowdsourcing markets to give better mechanisms.
We define the large market assumption as follows: We assume that in our model, the cost of a single item is very small compared to the buyer's budget B. More formally, let c max = max i∈S {c i }. Then, the large market assumption is defined as below.
The Large Market Assumption: c max B.
In other words, we define the largeness ratio of the market to be θ = c max B and analyze our mechanisms for when θ → 0.
This assumption -also known as the small bid to budget ratio assumption -is used in other largemarket problems as well (for instance, see Mehta et al. (2007) for a similar definition with application in online advertising). All the mechanisms that we present in the main body of the paper (mechanisms for additive utility functions) will be analyzed under this assumption. The mechanisms that we design for submodular utility functions work under a different large market assumption which is explained below.
An Alternative Assumption: We also suggest another definition for large markets, the discussion of which will be deferred to the full version of this paper. Our mechanisms for submodular utility functions work under this assumption; moreover, we can slightly modify our mechanisms for additive utility functions so that they work under this assumption as well, while preserving their approximation ratio. We define this assumption below.
Let u max = max i∈S u i and U * be the utility of the optimum solution (i.e. the maximum utility that the buyer can achieve when the costs are known to her). This large market assumption states that:
An Alternative Large Market Assumption:
In other words, we define the largeness ratio of the market to be θ = max i∈S u i U and analyze our mechanisms for when θ → 0.
We note that our impossibility result for additive utilities (Section VI) holds for either of the two definitions.
B. Our Results
In this paper, we design optimal budget-feasible mechanisms for large markets. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to study the case of large markets. We list our results below: 1) If the items are divisible, we design a deterministic mechanism which satisfies all the required properties (i.e. budget feasibility, individual rationality and truthfulness) and has an approximation ratio of 1 − 1/e (Section V). Note that previously, no mechanism was known for the case of divisible items. In fact, one can show that no bounded approximation ratio is possible for divisible items if the large market assumption is dismissed. 2) If the items are indivisible, we can modify our mechanism and give a randomized truthful mech-anism for this case which achieves approximation ratio 1 − 1/e. The proof is deferred to the full version of this paper. 3) In Section VI, we show that the above results are optimal by proving that no truthful (and possibly) randomized mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e. Our impossibility result holds for both cases of divisible and indivisible items. 4) For the case of submodular utility functions, we design deterministic mechanisms that achieve approximation ratios of 1 2 and 1 3 with exponential and polynomial running times respectively. Note that we only consider the case of indivisible items for submodular utility functions. The discussion of our results on submodular functions is deferred to the full version of this paper. As we saw in Section I-A1, one could define a notion of θ-large market, i.e. a market with largeness ratio θ.
To gain a better understating of the problem, we focus on large markets (i.e. when θ → 0) and state our main theorems for this setting. However, our mechanisms do not need "very large" markets to perform well; for instance, in the knapsack problem with additive utilities, the approximation ratio 2 is (1 − 1/e) · (1 − 6θ/5) when all the items have equal utilities (Section V-B). Thus, say for θ = 1/20 and θ = 1/40 (which are reasonable assumptions in many settings) we get approximation factors 0.592 and 0.613 respectively.
Also we point out that the above results have applications beyond crowdsourcing -for instance, see Singer (2011) for application in marketing over social networks, and Horel et al. (2013) for application in experiment design. Singer (2011) provides a truthful mechanism with approximation ratio ≈ 0.032 and Horel et al. (2013) provides an approximately truthful mechanism with approximation ratio ≈ 0.077. For both these settings, large market assumption is a very reasonable assumption to make; thus, our results apply to these applications as well. In particular, our results give fully truthful mechanisms for these applications with approximation ratios 1 2 , 1 3 (for exponential and polynomial running time respectively) in large markets.
C. Related Work
The most relevant related work is that of Singer (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) . Singer (2010) first introduced this model (without the large market assumption). For the case of additive utilities and indivisible items, he gave a deterministic mechanism with an approximation ratio of 1/6. Chen et al. (2011) later improved it to 1/(2 + √ 2), and also gave a randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of 1/3. They gave a lower bound of 1/(1 + √ 2) and 1/2 for deterministic and randomized mechanisms respectively. For the case of submodular utilities, Singer (2010) gave a randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of 1/112 which was improved to 1/7.91 by Chen et al. (2011) . Chen et al. (2011) also gave an exponential time deterministic mechanism for submodular utility functions with an approximation ratio of 1/8.34. Dobzinski et al. (2011) looked at the more general sub-additive utility functions and gave a 1/log 2 (n) and 1/log 3 (n) approximation ratio for randomized and deterministic mechanisms respectively. Singla and Krause (2013a) design budget-feasible mechanisms for adaptive submodular functions with applications in community sensing.
In another work, Bei et al. (2012) study this problem in Bayesian setting. Singer (2011) looks at the application of this model in marketing over social networks. Horel et al. (2013) study the application of this model in experiment design.
Another related model that has been inspired from crowdsourcing applications is when the workers arrive online. A sequence of papers model this as an online learning problem. See Singla and Krause (2013b); Badanidiyuru et al. (2012) ; Singer and Mittal (2013) for more details.
Finally, we note that our assumption for large markets is similar to the assumption made in other application areas; notably in the Adwords problem as studied by Mehta et al. (2007) . See Goel and Mehta (2008) ; Devanur and Hayes (2009); Feldman et al. (2010 Feldman et al. ( , 2009 for other models motivated by online advertising where they make similar assumptions.
D. Roadmap
The readers are encouraged to read this section before proceeding further. We begin by presententing a 1 2approximate mechanism (in section II) using a simple proportional share mechanism which was proposed in Singer (2010); Chen et al. (2011) . Then, in section III, we build our new ideas that help us find the optimal mechanism for the case of the additive utilities. This section also defines a simple version of our mechanism that is not truthful but is envy-free. We define our truthful mechansim in section IV. Both our envyfree and truthful mechanisms are parameterized by a single input variable (which we call standard allocation rule). Most of the work in the later sections goes in finding (and prooving) the optimal standard allocation rule. In particular, in section V, we find the standard allocation rule for which our mechanism provides an approximation ratio of 1 − 1/e in large markets. In section VI, we complement this result by showing that no truthful mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e. In the full version of this paper, we further adapt our mechanism to the case of indivisible items, and present two mechanisms for submodular utility functions which have exponential and polynomial running times and approximation ratios 1 2 and 1 3 , respectively.
II. A SIMPLE 1 2 -APPROXIMATE TRUTHFUL MECHANISM
In this section, we briefly explain the previous mechanism designed for this problem for the additive utility functions that gives an approximation factor of 1 2 in large markets.
Definition 1: Cost-per-utility rate of a seller i is equal to c i /u i . A natural approach to this problem tries to find a single payment-per-utility rate (denoted by rate r) at which all the winning sellers get paid. In other words, this approach picks a single number r and makes a payment of r.u i to seller i if she wins and pays her 0 otherwise. For brevity, we sometimes call the payment-per-utility rate r simply the rate r when there is no risk of confusion.
Individual rationality implies that a seller i is willing to sell her item at rate r iff r ≥ c i /u i . Initially the buyer declares a very large rate r, and then sees which sellers are willing to sell at this rate. If the total cost to buy from all these sellers at rate r is higher than the budget B, then the buyer decreases the rate r. More formally, a natural descending price auction for this problem works as follows: 1) Let A denote the set of active sellers, and initially set A = S. 2) Start with a very high rate r.
3) Verify if all the active sellers can be paid with rate r, i.e. whether i∈A r.u i ≤ B or not. 4) If the payment is feasible, then allocate the subset A, make the payment and stop. 5) If the payment is not feasible then decrease r slightly; update A accordingly by removing the sellers i for whom c i /u i > r; go to Step 3.
The above auction captures the main idea behind the proportional share mechanisms designed in Singer (2010); Chen et al. (2011) 3 , although they describe it in a forward auction format. It is not hard to see that the above mechanism is truthful, budget-feasible, and in large markets achieves an approximation ratio of 1 2 (with small modifications, this can be converted to a randomized 1 2 -approximation for arbitrary markets as well Chen et al. (2011) ).
III. OUR APPROACH
In this section, we give a high level overview of our approach. Subsections III-A and III-B are preliminary sections and must be read before proceeding further. Also for rest of the paper we will assume that the sellers' items are divisible, unless we explicitly talk about indivisible items.
A. A Notion of An Allocation Rule
To build our new ideas, we first introduce and formalize the notion of an allocation rule.
An allocation rule f : R + → [0, 1] is a function which determines how much to buy from a given seller. The domain of allocation rules is the cost per utility rate; meaning, given a (u i , c i ) pair of seller i, the allocation rule f says that we should buy f ( c i u i ) fraction of seller i's item. We do not enforce using the same allocation rule for all sellers.
We say an allocation rule f : R + → [0, 1] is a Standard Allocation Rule if f is a decreasing function such that f (0) = 1 and f (e − 1) = 0. 4 For any standard allocation rule f : R + → [0, 1], we can define an associated family of allocation rules
where f r denotes an allocation rule which is same as f except that it is stretched along the horizontal axis with ratio r, i.e. f r (x) = f (x/r) for all x ≥ 0.
As we will see later, any single standard allocation rule f and its corresponding family of allocation rules F(f ) will uniquely specify our mechanism. At a high level, our mechanism will work as follows: we will pick the largest positive r such that f r ∈ F(f ) is budget-feasible; meaning the sum of the payments with allocation rule f r does not exceed B. However, note that we have not yet defined a payment rule given an allocation rule f r -we define it next. Figure 1 : With allocation rule f r , the payment to seller i is defined to be u i times the shaded area under the curve.
B. Payment Rule
Recall that given a function f r ∈ F(f ) and (u i , c i ) pair for a seller i, the value of f r ( c i u i ) only tells us what fraction of seller i's item to buy. But how much should we pay seller i in order to give incentives to seller i to report its cost truthfully to the mechanism? We compute these payments based on the well known Myerson's characterization of the truthful mechanisms [Myerson (1981) ].
Let the payment rule for seller i is denoted by P i,r : R + → R + for an allocation rule f r . Here P i,r maps the reported cost of seller i into its payment.
To define P i,r , we do the following thought process: Let's divide seller i's item into u i different pieces. Note that now the seller's cost for each piece is c i u i . Thus function f r can now be seen as mapping the cost of a single piece into the fraction of that piece that we will buy. Let Q r (x) : R + → R + denote the function that maps the cost for a single piece into a payment for that piece. Now, Myerson's characterization [Myerson (1981) ] says that the payment for each piece is given by the following formula:
Intuitively, Q r (x) represents the area under the curve as seen in Figure 1 . Going forward, we will call the function Q r a unit-payment rule. Note that P i,r (x) and Q r are related by the following formula:
Thus, to summarize, for an allocation rule f r , we buy f r (c i /u i ) units of her item, and pay her P i,r (c i ) amount of money.
Remark: We make a remark that the above payment rule is truthful only if the allocation rule f r that is offered to seller i does not depend on the private information (cost c i in this case) of the seller i. If the allocation rule f r does depend on the private information of the seller, then the mechanism may or may not be truthful. In the next section we give a mechanism in which the allocation rule f r for a seller i depends on its reported costs. Later in section IV, we give a mechanism where the allocation rule f r for a seller i doesn't depend on its reported cost, thus our payment rule will ensure that the resulting mechanism is truthful.
C. First Attempt: A Parameterized Class of Envy-Free Mechanisms
In this section we describe a mechanism (denoted by Mechanism Envy-Free(f )) that is not always truthful, but it will form the basis of our truthful mechanism. Moreover, some structural results about this mechanism will be useful while analyzing our truthful mecahanism, thus we will be talking about this mechanism throughout the paper. This mechanism is parameterized by the choice of a standard allocation rule f . The mechanism described in this section offers a single allocation rule f r ∈ F(f ) to all the sellers, thus it is envy-free (although it may not be truthful).
Definition 2: We say that an allocation rule f r is a budget-feasible allocation rule if i∈S P i,r (c i ) = B, i.e. the payments defined with respect to f r sum up to B. Now given any standard allocation rule f , the mechanism starts with a very large scaling ratio r = ∞ so that we are guaranteed to have i∈S P i,r (c i ) > B.
Then, the mechanism decreases r until the rule f r becomes a budget-feasible rule (say at r = r ). The mechanism stops at this point and uses f r and {P i,r } i∈S to determine the allocations and payments. The ratio r is also called the stopping rate of the mechanism. We define this process formally in Mechanism Envy-Free(f ).
Mechanism Envy-Free: Parameterized by a standard allocation rule f input : Budget B, (u i , c i ) pair for each seller i output: A scaling ratio r r ← ∞; while f r is not a budget-feasible rule do Decrease r slightly; end r ← r; Output the scaling ratio r ;
One can easily see that the above mechanism is budget-feasible, individually rational, and envy-free; however, it may not be truthful. Also, the efficiency of the above mechanism depends on the choice of function f . Thus, an important question is: What is the optimal choice of function f ? Let's first understand the performance of the above mechanism for a simple choice of function f .
Definition 3: A standard allocation rule f : R + → [0, 1] is called a uniform standard allocation rule if f (x) = 1 for x < e − 1, and f (x) = 0 otherwise. Figure 2 depicts this curve.
One can show that the above envy-free mechanism when run using a uniform standard allocation rule, mimics the simple factor 1 2 mechanism presented earlier. Thus, it turns out to be truthful as well for this choice of standard allocation rule. However for more general allocation rules, the above envy-free mechanism might not be truthful. Thus before we answer the harder question about the optimal choice of function f , we next describe the truthful version of the above envyfree mechanism.
IV. A PARAMETERIZED CLASS OF TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS
We use a simple trick to convert Mechanism Envy-Free(f ) to a truthful mechanism. The idea is to define, for each seller i, an allocation rule which does not depend on c i . In particular, we define the allocation rule for seller i to be f r i , where r i will be chosen independently of c i . For finding r i , we run Mechanism Envy-Free(f ) on the instance which is obtained by setting c i to be 0 while keeping cost of the other sellers intact; r i would be the stopping rate of the mechanism Envy-Free(f ). The formal definition of the truthful mechanism appears in Mechanism Truthful(f ).
In Lemma 2, we prove that Mechanism Truthful(f ) is individually rational, truthful, and budget-feasible for any given standard allocation rule f . First, we state the following useful lemma.
Lemma 1: For any seller i ∈ S we have r ≥ r i .
Mechanism Truthful(f ): Parameterized by a standard allocation rule f input : Budget B, (u i , c i ) pair for each seller i
The proof is based on the fact that P i,r (x) is an increasing function of r (for a fixed x) and is a decreasing function of x (for a fixed r). The proof is by contradiction, suppose r < r i . Let c j = c j for all j ∈ S\{i} and let c i = 0. Observe that
where the first inequality is due to the fact that P j,r (x) is a decreasing function of x and the second inequality is due to the fact that r < r i . However, note that the above inequalities imply that B < j∈S P j,r i (c j ), which contradicts with the budget feasibility of Mechanism Envy-Free(f ): see that j∈S P j,r i (c j ) represents the payment of Envy-Free(f ) when the costs are c 1 , . . . , c n , and so it can not be larger than B.
Lemma 2: Mechanism Truthful(f ) is individually rational, truthful, and budget-feasible.
Proof: Note that the allocation and payment rules for seller i, i.e. f r i , P i,r i , do not depend on the cost reported by her. This fact, along with the fact that f r i is a monotone rule (decreasing function) implies individual rationality and truthfulness. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Myerson's Lemma and we do not repeat it here.
The proof for budget feasibility needs a bit more work. Let p i , p i denote the payments to seller i respectively in Mechanism Truthful(f ) and Mechanism Envy-Free(f ), i.e. p i = P i,r i (c i ) and p i = P i,r (c i ). The lemma is proved if we show that p i ≤ p i , since we have i∈S p i = B.
To see p i ≤ p i , note that P i,r (x) is an increasing function of r (for a fixed x). So, since we have r ≥ r i due to Lemma 1, it must be the case that P i,r i (c i ) ≤ P i,r (c i ).
V. A (1 − 1/e)-APPROXIMATE OPTIMAL TRUTHFUL MECHANISM
So far, we have introduced a parameterized class of individually rational, truthful, and budget-feasible mechanisms for the problem: Passing any standard allocation rule f to Mechanism Truthful(f ) fixes the mechanism which we denote by M f . Our goal in this section is to find the most efficient mechanism in this class. Formally, given a standard allocation rule f , we denote the approximation ratio of M f by R f and define it as:
where the infimum is taken over all instances I of the problem 5 . Here U f (I) denotes the utility obtained by M f in instance I, and U (I) denotes the optimum utility in instance I. The most efficient allocation rule f , is the one which maximizes R f . Our goal, in this section and Section VI, is to find the most efficient allocation rule and its corresponding approximation ratio. Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Under the large market assumption, and with additive utilities, the most efficient standard allocation rule for Mechanism Truthful(f ) is f (x) = ln(e − x), for which we get R f = 1 − 1/e, i.e. it has an approximation ratio 1 − 1/e. We prove this theorem in two parts: In the first part we show that R f ≥ 1 − 1/e for f (x) = ln(e − x); this is proved in the current section. In the second part, we show that R g ≤ 1 − 1/e for any standard allocation rule g. This fact can be seen as a consequence of our hardness result in Section VI, which states that no truthful mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e. We also provide a more direct (alternative) proof in the full version of this paper that shows our choice of f (x) = ln(e −x) is optimal among all possible choices of the standard allocation rules.
A. Finding an optimal f for the (non-truthful) Mechanism Envy-Free(f ) In this section, we prove that Mechanism Envy-Free(f ) has approximation ratio 1 − 1/e for f (x) = ln(e − x). Note that the Mechanism Envy-Free(f ) is not truthful, however its analysis will be helpful when analyzing our truthful mechanism in Section V-B. Here, we analyze Mechanism Envy-Free(f ) assuming that the true costs are known; later, in Section V-B, we use this result to prove that Mechanism Truthful(f ) has approximation ratio 1 − 1/e for the same choice of f . 1) Preliminaries: We use g r to denote the inverse of an allocation rule f r , i.e. g r (x) = f −1 r (x). Given an allocation rule f r , we also write an alternative definition of its corresponding unit-payment rule Q r . This definition, rather than being in terms of c i u i , would be in terms of f r ( c i u i ). This alternative definition is denoted by G r , and is defined such that
. For instance, if a seller owns an item with utility 1, then we pay her G r (x) when a fraction x of her item is allocated. To be more precise, for
We also denote g 1 and G 1 respectively by g and G.
Proposition 1: Given the standard allocation rule f (x) = ln(e − x), it is straight-forward to verify that g(x) = e − e x and G(x) = ex − e x + 1. Also, f r (x) = ln er−x r . From now on in this section, we assume that f (x) = ln(e − x). Next, we prove a useful inequality in the following lemma which will be used in the analysis of Envy-Free(f ).
Lemma 3: For any x, α such that 0 ≤ x, α ≤ 1 we have
In other words, we will show that approximation ratio approaches 1 − 1/e as θ, the market's largeness ratio, approaches 0 for the case of unit utilities. The proof for the case of general utilities is intricate and appears in the full version of the paper.
Note that the assumption of unit utilities imply c i /u i = c i for any seller i. Next, we state two lemmas before proving the approximation ratio. For simplicity in the analysis, w.l.o.g., assume that c 1 ≤ c 2 ≤ . . . ≤ c n .
Lemma 5: r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ . . . ≥ r n . Lemma 6: Let u (b) : R + → R + denote the maximum utility that the buyer can achieve with budget b (when the items are divisible). Then, u (b) is a concave function.
Proofs for both of these lemmas are straight-forward and are deferred to the full version of the paper.
Lemma 7: Mechanism Truthful(f ) has approximation ratio 1 − 1/e when all the items have utility equal to 1.
Proof: Recall that U = u (B) and let U denote the utility achieved by Mechanism Truthful(f ). We need to show that (1 − 1/e) · U ≤ U . Instead of showing that U = i∈S f r i (c i ) is large enough compared to U , we show that i∈S f r n (c i ) is large enough compared to U ; the lemma then would be proved since we have
, it is enough to note that r n ≤ r i due to Lemma 5 which implies f r n (c i ) ≤ f r i (c i ).
We consider two cases for the proof: In Case 1 we assume c max ≤ c, and in Case 2 we assume otherwise, where the number c is the cost at which f r n (c) = 1 − 1/e, more precisely, this happens at c = r n (e−e 1−1/e ).
Case 1: In this case, observe that we have f r n (c i ) ≥ 1−1/e for all i ∈ S, which implies f r i (c i ) ≥ 1−1/e. This just means U ≥ (1−1/e)n ≥ (1−1/e)U .
Case 2: Let U n = i∈S f r n (c i ), we will show that
To prove this, consider an auxiliary instance in which, instead of budget B, we have a reduced budget B = i∈S Q r n (c i ). Note that if we run Mechanism Envy-Free(f ) on the auxiliary instance, then its stopping rate is r n , and so, the utility gained by the mechanism is exactly U n . Let U aux denote the optimal utility in the auxiliary instance. Then, by applying Lemma 4 on the auxiliary instance, we have U n ≥ (1 − 1/e) · U aux . So, if we show that
then (4) holds and the proof is complete.
We use Lemma 6 to prove (5): First, we show that B ≥ (1 − o(1)) · B; then, applying Lemma 6 would imply that u (B ) ≥ (1 − o(1)) · u (B), which is identical to (5) by definition. So all we need to complete the proof is showing that B ≥ (1 − o(1) ) · B.
To this end, we prove that B ≥ (1 − α · c max B ) · B, where α is a constant with value (e − e 1−1/e ) −1 ≈ 6/5. This would prove the Lemma due to the large market assumption. First, observe that
Now, recall that in Case 2, we have c max ≥ c, which implies B ≥ c · B c max = r n (e − e 1−1/e ) · B c max ⇒ c max · (e − e 1−1/e ) −1 ≥ r n .
Combining (6) and (7) implies B ≥ (1 − α · c max B ) · B with the promised value for α.
VI. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT: ON WHY 1 − 1/e IS THE BEST APPROXIMATION POSSIBLE In this section we show that no truthful (and possibly) randomized mechanism achieves approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e. The proofs are deferred to the full version of the paper and we include only an outline of the proof together with the instance used in the proof. We show a stronger claim by allowing the mechanism to satisfy the budget feasibility in expectation, i.e. we prove that no truthful mechanism that is budget-feasible in expectation can achieve a ratio better than 1 − 1/e. Proof Outline.: We construct a bayesian instance of the problem and prove that no budget-feasible truthful mechanism for this instance can achieve approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e; this also implies that no mechanism for the prior-free setting can achieve ratio better than 1 − 1/e 6 . The proof is done in two steps. First, we show that for any truthful mechanism for this instance, there exists a simple posted price mechanism that achieves at least the same revenue. The posted price mechanism simply offers the same price p to every seller and pays p to any seller who accepts the offer and 0 to others. In the second step of the proof, we show that for any choice of p, such mechanisms cannot achieve a ratio better than 1 − 1/e. The proof that we present, w.l.o.g. analyzes the market in expectation: budget feasibility is satisfied in expectation; also, the utility of the mechanisms are computed in expectation.
We present the instance used in the proof below and leave the rest of the proof to the full version of the paper.
The Impossibility Instance.: We construct a bayesian instance of the problem in which all the sellers have unit utility and their costs are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F , defined as follows:
In other words, F (x) denotes the probability that the cost of a seller is at most x. Let D be the distribution defined by F and let c denote the expected cost of a seller sampled from D, i.e. c = E x∼D [x] . We define the budget to be B = c · N where N ≥ 1 is an arbitrary integer denoting the number of sellers.
